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Wenn ein Sachversta¨ndiger sein halbes Leben darauf verwendet, einen dunkeln Gegenstand
u¨berall aufzukla¨ren, so wird er wohl weiter kommen als derjenige, welcher in kurzer
Zeit damit vertraut sein will. Daß also nicht jeder von neuem aufzura¨umen und sich
durchzuarbeiten habe, sondern die Sache geordnet und gelichtet finde, dazu ist die Theorie
vorhanden.1
(Carl von Clausewitz: Vom Kriege)
Abstract
The standard design of soccer penalty shootouts has received serious criticism due
to its bias towards the team that kicks the first penalty. The rule-making body
of the sport has decided in 2017 to try an alternative mechanism. Although the
adoption of the new policy has stalled, academic researchers have recently suggested
some other designs to improve fairness. This paper offers an extensive overview
of seven such soccer penalty shootout mechanisms, one of them first defined here.
Their fairness are analysed in three different mathematical models of psychological
pressure. We also consider the probability of reaching the sudden death stage, as
well as the complexity and strategy-proofness of the designs. Some rules are found to
be inferior as they do not lead to a substantial gain in fairness compared to simpler
mechanisms. Our work has the potential to impact decision-makers who can save
resources by choosing only theoretically competitive designs for field experiments.
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1 Introduction
The order of actions in a sequential contest can generate various psychological effects that
may change the ex-ante winning probabilities of the contestants. Soccer penalty shootouts,
used to decide a tied match in a knockout tournament, offer a natural laboratory to test
whether teams with equally skilled players have the same probability to win. Since the
team favoured by a coin toss can decide to kick the first or the second penalty in all rounds
(before June 2003, this team was automatically the first-mover), psychological pressure
may mean that the second-mover has significantly less than 50% chance to win.
Previous research has shown mixed evidence and resulted in an intensive debate. While
most authors find that the starting team enjoys an advantage (Apesteguia and Palacios-
Huerta, 2010; Palacios-Huerta, 2014; Da Silva et al., 2018; Rudi et al., 2019), some papers
do not report such a problem (Kocher et al., 2012; Arrondel et al., 2019). Vandebroek et al.
(2018) argue that this disagreement is mainly due to inadequate sample sizes, thus the
natural solution would be to design and implement an appropriate field experiment—but
this would take years.
Nonetheless, almost all stakeholders recognise that penalty shootouts are potentially
unfair. According to a survey, more than 90% of coaches and players choose to increase
the psychological pressure on the other team by kicking the first penalties (Apesteguia and
Palacios-Huerta, 2010). The IFAB (International Football Association Board), the rule-
making body of soccer has recently planned to consult “a potentially fairer system of taking
kicks from the penalty mark” (IFAB, 2017, 2018, Section “The future”). A straightforward
alternative, the Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) rule, has been trialled in some matches (Csato´, 2020).
However, the 133rd Annual Business Meeting (ABM) of the IFAB has decided to stop the
experiment due to “the absence of strong support, mainly because the procedure is complex”
(FIFA, 2018).
In our opinion, with the increasing use of information technology in a soccer game such
as the video assistant referee (VAR), the fairness of penalty shootouts will probably emerge
as a topic of controversy in the future, and some alternative mechanisms will be tested on
the field. Even though the Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) sequence has been found to provide no
advantage for any player in a tennis tiebreak (Cohen-Zada et al., 2018), and Monte Carlo
simulations show that it substantially mitigates the bias in soccer (Del Giudice, 2019), this
is not the only solution to ensure fairness. Palacios-Huerta (2012) has argued to follow
the Prouhet-Thue-Morse sequence, where the first 𝑛 moves are mirrored in the next 𝑛.
Recent suggestions include the Catch-up rule (Brams and Ismail, 2018), its variant called
the Adjusted Catch-up rule (Csato´, 2020), and the Behind-first rule (Anbarcı et al., 2019).
We contribute to the topic by evaluating all these mechanisms in three different
probabilistic models that reflect the potential advantage of the team kicking the first
penalty. Besides summarising probably all findings of the previous literature on penalty
shootout rules, this comprehensive review attempts to quantify the fairness of seven
different designs and to consider other aspects such as the probability of reaching the
sudden death stage, or the complexity of each rule. Wherever possible, analytical proofs
are provided for the conjectures derived from numerical calculations as Propositions 1 and
2 illustrate.
From the plethora of interesting findings, the following results are worth underlining.
The Catch-up rule turns out to be inferior compared to the straightforward Alternating
(𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) rule as it does not yield any gain in fairness but it is more complex. On the other
hand, the Behind-first mechanism—that alternates the shooting order but guarantees the
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first penalty to the team lagging behind in each round—somewhat overperforms them
concerning fairness, which can be improved further by compensating the second-mover
in the sudden death based on an idea of Csato´ (2020). This Adjusted Behind-first rule,
introduced in the current work, emerges as a promising alternative to the standard design.
Why is such an extensive but abstract study necessary? Firstly, empirical results are
often disputed due to problems with the selection and the size of the datasets. Secondly,
the mechanisms proposed recently have never been implemented in practice. Thirdly, since
field experiments take a long time to carry out, it would be beneficial to filter out poor
alternative mechanisms and save the resources for theoretically attractive policy changes.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the penalty shootout designs to be
compared and discusses three ways to mathematically formalise psychological pressure.
Our findings are detailed in Section 3. Section 3.1 computes the probability of winning in
the sudden death stage, Section 3.2 summarises the theoretical results on the fairness of
penalty shootout mechanisms, while Section 3.3 contains the numerical calculations for a
large set of parameters. Section 3.4 deals with some questions beyond fairness. Finally,
Section 4 offers concluding remarks.
2 Mechanisms and probability models
Denote the team that kicks the first penalty by 𝐴, and the other team by 𝐵. The penalty
shootout consists of five rounds in its regular phase. In each round, both teams kick one
penalty. The shooting order in a round can be (1) independent of the outcomes in the
previous rounds (deterministic rule); (2) influenced by the results of preceding penalties
(stochastic rule). The scores are aggregated after the five rounds, and the team which has
scored more goals than the other wins the match. If the scores are level, the sudden death
stage starts and continues until one team scores a goal more than the other from the same
number of penalties.
2.1 Penalty shootout designs
We investigate three deterministic procedures:
∙ Standard (𝐴𝐵𝐴𝐵) rule: team 𝐴 kicks the first, and team 𝐵 kicks the second
penalty in each round. This is the official soccer penalty shootout design.
∙ Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) rule: the order of the teams alternates, the second round
(𝐵𝐴) mirrors the first (𝐴𝐵), and this sequence continues without any change,
even in the possible sudden death phase.
∙ 𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴|𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵 rule: the order in the first two rounds is 𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴, which is mirrored
in the next two (𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵), and this sequence is repeated.
The “double alternating” 𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴|𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵 mechanism is considered as it takes us one step
closer to the Prouhet-Thue-Morse sequence than the Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) design. In our
opinion, it is unlikely that the administrators want to move further along this line.
There are two stochastic designs, both of them having two variants:
∙ Catch-up rule (Brams and Ismail, 2018): the first kicking team alternates but the
shooting order does not change if the first kicker missed and the second succeeded
in the previous round.
3
∙ Adjusted Catch-up rule (Csato´, 2020): the first five rounds are designed according
to the Catch-up rule, however, team 𝐵 kicks the first penalty in the sudden death
stage (sixth round) regardless of the outcome in the previous round.
∙ Behind-first rule (Anbarcı et al., 2019): the team having less score after some
rounds kicks the first penalty in the next round, and the order of the previous
round is mirrored if the score is tied.
∙ Adjusted Behind-first rule: the first five rounds are designed according to the
Behind-first rule, however, team 𝐵 kicks the first penalty in the sudden death
stage (sixth round) regardless of the outcome in the previous round.
The Adjusted Behind-first mechanism applies the idea underlying the Adjusted Catch-up
rule, introduced in Csato´ (2020), for the Behind-first design. According to our knowledge,
it is first defined here.
Table 1: An illustration of the seven penalty shootout mechanisms
Penalty kicks in the regular phase Sudden death
Mechanism Team 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
𝐴𝐵𝐴𝐵 A 7 4 7 4 7 4 4
B 4 4 7 7 7 4 7
𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴 A 7 4 7 4 7 4 4
B 4 4 7 7 7 4 7
𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴|𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵 A 7 4 7 4 7 4 4
B 4 4 7 7 7 4 7
Catch-up A 7 4 7 4 7 4 4
B 4 4 7 7 7 4 7
Adj. Catch-up A 7 4 7 4 7 4 4
B 4 4 7 7 7 4 7
Behind-first A 7 4 7 4 7 4 4
B 4 4 7 7 7 4 7
Adj. Behind-first A 7 4 7 4 7 4 4
B 4 4 7 7 7 4 7
Table 1 illustrates the seven penalty shootout designs. Since the scores are 3-3 after
five penalties, the shootout goes to sudden death, where both teams succeed in the sixth
round. However, in the seventh round only team 𝐴 scores, implying that it wins the
match.
Note that the four stochastic mechanisms lead to different shooting orders. Team 𝐵
kicks the first penalty in the third round under the Catch-up rule because both teams miss
in the second round where team 𝐴 is the first-mover. On the other hand, the Behind-first
rule favours team 𝐴 in the third round as it is lagging in the number of goals. Both designs
give the first penalty in the sixth round to team 𝐴 since team 𝐵 is the first-mover in the
fifth round. However, the Adjusted Catch-up and Behind-first rules compensate team
𝐵 by kicking first in the sudden death for being disadvantaged in the first round of the
shootout.
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2.2 Models of psychological pressure
According to Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010, Figure 2A), the first kicking team
scores its penalties with a higher probability in all rounds. A possible reason is that most
soccer penalties are successful, thus the player taking the second kick usually faces greater
mental pressure. Therefore, following Brams and Ismail (2018) and Csato´ (2020), our first
model M1 assumes that the first kicker has a probability 𝑝 of scoring, while the second
kicker has a probability 𝑞 of scoring, where 𝑝 ≥ 𝑞.
However, this anxiety may be missing if the first kicker fails. The second model M2
assumes that each player has a probability 𝑝 of scoring, except for the second shooter after
a successful penalty, who scores with probability 𝑞, where 𝑝 ≥ 𝑞.
Finally, the psychological pressure can come from lagging in the number of goals as
Vandebroek et al. (2018) argue. Consequently, the third model M3 is defined such that
each player has a probability 𝑝 of scoring, except for the kicker from the team having fewer
scores, who succeeds with probability 𝑞, where 𝑝 ≥ 𝑞.
Example 2.1. Consider a penalty shootout, which stands at 2-3 with the first-mover
in the fourth round lagging behind. The probability models above have the following
implications (recall that 𝑝 ≥ 𝑞).
∙ Model M1: The 7th penalty is scored with probability 𝑝. The 8th penalty is
scored with probability 𝑞.
∙ Model M2: The 7th penalty is scored with probability 𝑝. The 8th penalty is
scored with probability 𝑝 if the 7th penalty was unsuccessful, and with probability
𝑞 if the 7th penalty was successful.
∙ Model M3: The 7th penalty is scored with probability 𝑞. The 8th penalty is
scored with probability 𝑝.
All of the above models are mainly consistent with previous observations. Empirical
testing of their validity is beyond the scope of the current work.
3 Results
The fairness of the soccer penalty shootout is usually interpreted such that no team should
have an advantage because of winning or losing the coin toss. Therefore, a mechanism
is called fairer than another if the probability of winning is closer to 0.5 for two equally
skilled teams.
3.1 The probability of winning in the sudden death
The first five rounds of a shootout can be represented by a finite sequence of binary
numbers as each penalty is either scored or missed. However, the sudden death has no
definite end, thus it is necessary to calculate the winning probabilities in this phase by
hand. With a slight abuse of notation, denote by 𝑊 (𝐴) the winning probability of the
team kicking the first penalty in the sudden death.
In model M1, Brams and Ismail (2018, p. 192) derives for the Standard (𝐴𝐵𝐴𝐵) rule
that
𝑊 𝑆1 (𝐴) =
𝑝(1− 𝑞)
𝑝+ 𝑞 − 2𝑝𝑞 .
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Models M2 and M3 are equivalent in the sudden death, where only the second team
can have less goals scored. Hence 𝑊 𝑆2 (𝐴) = 𝑝(1− 𝑞) + [𝑝𝑞 + (1− 𝑝)(1− 𝑝)]𝑊 𝑆2 (𝐴), which
leads to
𝑊 𝑆2 (𝐴) =
𝑝(1− 𝑞)
2𝑝− 𝑝𝑞 − 𝑝2 .
The 𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴, (Adjusted) Catch-up, and (Adjusted) Behind-first mechanisms coincide
in the sudden death where they imply an alternating order of kicking.
In model M1, according to Brams and Ismail (2018, p. 192):
𝑊𝑅1 (𝐴) =
1− 𝑞 + 𝑝𝑞
2− 𝑝− 𝑞 + 2𝑝𝑞 .
In models M2 and M3, 𝑊𝑅2 (𝐴) = 𝑝(1− 𝑞) + [𝑝𝑞 + (1− 𝑝)(1− 𝑝)]
[︁
1−𝑊𝑅2 (𝐴)
]︁
as the
first penalty in the second round of the sudden death is kicked by team 𝐵, that is,
𝑊𝑅2 (𝐴) =
1− 𝑝+ 𝑝2
2− 2𝑝+ 𝑝𝑞 + 𝑝2 .
Finally, the sudden death of the 𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴|𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵 rule is the most complicated one. Here
there are two different cases: (a) the winning probability is 𝑊 (𝐴𝐴) when team 𝐴 kicks
the first penalty in the first two rounds of this phase, which is followed by two rounds with
team 𝐵 being the first kicker; and (b) the winning probability is 𝑊 (𝐴𝐵) when team 𝐴
kicks the first penalty in the first round of the sudden death, continued with two rounds
where team 𝐵 is the first kicker.
Consider model M1. The first round of the sudden death is won by team 𝐴 with
probability 𝑝(1 − 𝑞). The sudden death reaches its second round with probability 𝑝𝑞 +
(1− 𝑝)(1− 𝑞). It is won by the team kicking the first penalty in the second round with
probability 𝑝(1− 𝑞), while it is won by the team kicking the second penalty in the second
round with probability (1− 𝑝)𝑞. Consequently,
𝑊1(𝐴𝐴) = 𝑝(1− 𝑞) + [𝑝𝑞 + (1− 𝑝)(1− 𝑞)] 𝑝(1− 𝑞) + [𝑝𝑞 + (1− 𝑝)(1− 𝑞)]2 [1−𝑊1(𝐴𝐴)]
𝑊1(𝐴𝐴) =
𝑝(1− 𝑞) + (1− 𝑝− 𝑞 + 2𝑝𝑞) 𝑝(1− 𝑞) + (1− 𝑝− 𝑞 + 2𝑝𝑞)2
1 + (1− 𝑝− 𝑞 + 2𝑝𝑞)2 .
Analogously,
𝑊1(𝐴𝐵) = 𝑝(1− 𝑞) + [𝑝𝑞 + (1− 𝑝)(1− 𝑞)] (1− 𝑝)𝑞 + [𝑝𝑞 + (1− 𝑝)(1− 𝑞)]2 [1−𝑊1(𝐴𝐵)]
𝑊1(𝐴𝐵) =
𝑝(1− 𝑞) + (1− 𝑝− 𝑞 + 2𝑝𝑞) (1− 𝑝)𝑞 + (1− 𝑝− 𝑞 + 2𝑝𝑞)2
1 + (1− 𝑝− 𝑞 + 2𝑝𝑞)2 .
Consider models M2 and M3, which contain two differences compared to model M1:
(1) in any round, the winning probability of the second kicker is (1 − 𝑝)𝑝 instead of
(1 − 𝑝)𝑞; and (2) the probability of reaching the next round is 𝑝𝑞 + (1 − 𝑝)2 instead of
𝑝𝑞 + (1− 𝑝)(1− 𝑞). Hence, similar calculations show that
𝑊2(𝐴𝐴) =
𝑝(1− 𝑞) + (1− 2𝑝+ 𝑝𝑞 + 𝑝2) 𝑝(1− 𝑞) + (1− 2𝑝+ 𝑝𝑞 + 𝑝2)2
1 + (1− 2𝑝+ 𝑝𝑞 + 𝑝2)2 ,
and
𝑊2(𝐴𝐵) =
𝑝(1− 𝑞) + (1− 2𝑝+ 𝑝𝑞 + 𝑝2) (1− 𝑝)𝑝+ (1− 2𝑝+ 𝑝𝑞 + 𝑝2)2
1 + (1− 2𝑝+ 𝑝𝑞 + 𝑝2)2 .
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3.2 Theoretical findings
Despite the relatively simple mathematical models, it is non-trivial to obtain analytical
statements as five rounds of penalties mean 210 = 1024 different scenarios, and the
probability of each contains ten items from the set of 𝑝, 𝑞, (1− 𝑝), and (1− 𝑞). In practice,
the shootout is finished if one team has scored more goals than the other could score, but
this consideration does not decrease significantly the number of cases. We summarise two
results from the previous literature and prove a third for the stochastic designs in model
M3.
According to Echenique (2017), a crucial condition of the psychological advantage
enjoyed by the first-mover is the following: the probability that the first shooter scores
and the second shooter misses is greater than the probability that the first shooter misses
and the second scores. Models M1 and M2 satisfy this requirement as 𝑝 > 𝑞 implies
𝑝(1 − 𝑞) > (1 − 𝑝)𝑞 and 𝑝(1 − 𝑞) > (1 − 𝑝)𝑝. Echenique (2017, Proposition 2) states
that the condition is sufficient and necessary for the first shooter advantage under the
Standard (𝐴𝐵𝐴𝐵) and the Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) rules. Furthermore, the Alternating
(𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) mechanism is always fairer than the Standard (𝐴𝐵𝐴𝐵) mechanism if it holds.
Regarding model M3, the winning probability of the first team does not depend on the
number of rounds in the regular phase under the Standard (𝐴𝐵𝐴𝐵) model (Vandebroek
et al., 2018, p. 735).
The following result is first presented here.
Proposition 1. The Catch-up and Behind-first rules lead to the same winning probabilities
in model M3.
Proof. The probability of each possible outcome is shown to be the same under the Catch-
up and Behind-first rules. This probability is the product of the individual probabilities in
every round.
Assume that the Catch-up and Behind-first rules differ in the probability of the
𝑘th round. Hence the order of the teams in the 𝑘th round should be different under
the two rules, 𝐶𝐷 for the Catch-up and 𝐷𝐶 for the Behind-first. If the scores of the
teams are different at the beginning of the 𝑘th round, then the team lagging behind has
the probability 𝑞 of scoring, and the other team has the probability 𝑝 of scoring. The
commutative property of multiplication means that the probability of the 𝑘th round is
independent of the shooting order, which contradicts the assumption above. To conclude,
the teams should be tied at the beginning of the 𝑘th round and their shooting under
should be different under the two mechanisms.
Consider the case when the shooting order in the (𝑘 − 1)th round was 𝐶𝐷 by the
Catch-up rule. Consequently, team 𝐶 missed, while team 𝐷 succeeded in the (𝑘 − 1)th
round as otherwise, the Catch-up rule would imply the alternated order 𝐷𝐶 in the 𝑘th
round. Therefore, team 𝐷 was lagging behind (by one goal) at the beginning of the
(𝑘−1)th round, thus the shooting order in the (𝑘−1)th round was 𝐷𝐶 by the Behind-first
rule. It is a contradiction since no team is lagging behind at the beginning of the 𝑘th
round and the order of the previous round was 𝐷𝐶 under the Behind-first rule, thus it
should be 𝐶𝐷 in the 𝑘th round according to this mechanism.
Consider the case when the shooting order in the (𝑘 − 1)th round was 𝐷𝐶 by the
Catch-up rule. Then there are three possibilities:
∙ Team 𝐶 scored and team 𝐷 failed in the (𝑘 − 1)th round
This contradicts the assumption that the shooting order in the 𝑘th round is 𝐶𝐷
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under the Catch-up rule as this mechanism implies the unchanged order 𝐷𝐶 in
the 𝑘th round.
∙ Team 𝐶 failed and team 𝐷 scored in the (𝑘 − 1)th round
Since the teams are tied at the beginning of the 𝑘th round, team 𝐷 was lagging
in the score at the beginning of the (𝑘 − 1)th round. The shooting order in the
(𝑘 − 1)th round was 𝐷𝐶 under the Behind-first rule, contradicting the shooting
order 𝐷𝐶 in the 𝑘th round by the Behind-first rule as this mechanism implies an
alternated order if the score is tied, which is the case for the 𝑘th round.
∙ Both teams failed or both teams scored in the (𝑘 − 1)th round
Since the scores were level at the beginning of the (𝑘−1)th round, too, the shooting
order was 𝐶𝐷 under the Behind-first rule. The repetition of the arguments above
results in by backward induction that the teams should have been tied at the
beginning of the penalty shootout, which is trivial, and the shooting order in
the first round should have been different under the two mechanisms, which is
impossible.
The proof is completed as the assumption leads to a contradiction in each of the
possible cases discussed above.
Corollary 3.1. The Adjusted Catch-up and Adjusted Behind-first rules imply the same
winning probabilities in model M3.
Proof. The Adjusted Catch-up and Adjusted Behind-first rules coincide with the Catch-up
and Behind-first rules, respectively, in the regular stage. Both of them give the first penalty
of the sudden death to team 𝐵, and they follow an alternating order in this phase.
3.3 The analysis of fairness
The probability of winning can be accurately determined by a computer code for any
values of 𝑝 and 𝑞 to gain an insight into the fairness of the presented penalty shootout
mechanisms.
First, similarly to Brams and Ismail (2018), we use the values 𝑝 = 3/4 and 𝑞 = 2/3
that are close to the empirical scoring probabilities. Table 2 reveals the probability of
winning for team 𝐴 that kicks the first penalty. The Standard (𝐴𝐵𝐴𝐵) rule is the most
unfair, and it deviates from equality even further as the number of rounds in the regular
stage grows. Some rules, especially the 𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴|𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵, can favour the second-mover team
𝐵 in models M1 and M2 but not in M3. The Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴), (Adjusted) Catch-up,
and (Adjusted) Behind-first designs exhibit a moderate odd-even effect: they are less
fair when the number of rounds is odd, which restricts the opportunities to balance the
advantage enjoyed by team 𝐴. There are similar cycles with the length of four under the
𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴|𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵 rule.
The calculations reflect the theoretical contributions: (a) the Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴)
mechanism outperforms the Standard (𝐴𝐵𝐴𝐵) mechanism in models M1 and M2 (Eche-
nique, 2017); (b) the fairness of the Standard (𝐴𝐵𝐴𝐵) rule is not influenced by the
number of rounds in model M3 (Vandebroek et al., 2018); (c) the (Adjusted) Catch-up
and the (Adjusted) Behind-first designs lead to the same winning probabilities in model
M3 (Proposition 1). All rules are fairer in model M2 compared to model M1 because the
preference towards the first shooter is weaker in the former model.
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Table 2: The probability that 𝐴 wins including sudden death (𝑝 = 3/4 and 𝑞 = 2/3)
(a) Model M1: the second player has a scoring probability 𝑞
Model M1 Number of rounds
Mechanism 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
𝐴𝐵𝐴𝐵 0.600 0.608 0.618 0.628 0.637 0.645 0.653 0.661
𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴 0.526 0.511 0.519 0.508 0.515 0.507 0.513 0.506
𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴|𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵 0.513 0.494 0.489 0.504 0.509 0.497 0.492 0.503
Catch-up 0.526 0.516 0.518 0.513 0.514 0.512 0.512 0.511
Adjusted Catch-up 0.526 0.495 0.515 0.501 0.509 0.504 0.507 0.504
Behind-first 0.526 0.516 0.516 0.512 0.512 0.510 0.510 0.508
Adjusted Behind-first 0.526 0.495 0.512 0.500 0.506 0.501 0.503 0.501
(b) Model M2: the second player has a scoring probability 𝑞 if the first player succeeds
Model M2 Number of rounds
Mechanism 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
𝐴𝐵𝐴𝐵 0.571 0.578 0.586 0.593 0.600 0.606 0.612 0.618
𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴 0.520 0.508 0.514 0.506 0.511 0.505 0.509 0.504
𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴|𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵 0.510 0.496 0.492 0.503 0.506 0.497 0.494 0.502
Catch-up 0.520 0.513 0.514 0.510 0.511 0.509 0.509 0.508
Adjusted Catch-up 0.520 0.497 0.510 0.502 0.506 0.503 0.505 0.503
Behind-first 0.520 0.513 0.513 0.510 0.509 0.508 0.507 0.507
Adjusted Behind-first 0.520 0.497 0.509 0.501 0.505 0.502 0.503 0.501
(c) Model M3: the team lagging behind has a scoring probability 𝑞
Model M3 Number of rounds
Mechanism 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
𝐴𝐵𝐴𝐵 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.571
𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴 0.520 0.516 0.514 0.514 0.512 0.512 0.511 0.511
𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴|𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵 0.510 0.504 0.507 0.510 0.507 0.504 0.507 0.508
Catch-up 0.520 0.515 0.515 0.513 0.513 0.512 0.511 0.511
Adjusted Catch-up 0.520 0.501 0.513 0.506 0.510 0.507 0.508 0.508
Behind-first 0.520 0.515 0.515 0.513 0.513 0.512 0.511 0.511
Adjusted Behind-first 0.520 0.501 0.513 0.506 0.510 0.507 0.508 0.508
The Catch-up rule is not fairer than the already tried Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) rule, and
the Behind-first rule does not perform considerably better than them. However, the minor
amendment proposed by Csato´ (2020) in the first round of the sudden death consistently
makes the stochastic designs fairer. Thus they become a competitive alternative to the
deterministic 𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴|𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵 that aims to implement the Prohuet-True-Morse sequence,
especially in model M1.
In order to extend these findings, Figures 1–3 plot the winning probability of team
𝐴 as the function of parameter 𝑞—that has a different meaning in each model—for four
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Figure 1: The probability that team 𝐴 wins a penalty shootout
over five rounds including sudden death, model M1
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values of 𝑝, the scoring probability of the advantaged team. The Standard (𝐴𝐵𝐴𝐵) rule is
not depicted due to its high level of unfairness, which makes it impossible to visualise this
mechanism together with the other six. The lessons from these graphs can be summarised
as follows:
∙ All mechanisms are closer to fairness in model M2 than in model M1 because the
former punishes the second player only if the first player scores.
∙ Fairness is the most difficult to achieve in model M3, where the disadvantage of
team 𝐵 cannot be balanced by providing it with a higher scoring probability as
the first kicker in a round. On the other hand, the Standard (𝐴𝐵𝐴𝐵) rule is the
least unfair in model M3.
∙ The straightforward Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) rule is not worse than the stochastic
Catch-up rule, the use of the latter cannot be justified by the need to improve
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Figure 2: The probability that team 𝐴 wins a penalty shootout
over five rounds including sudden death, model M2
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fairness. This finding considerably decreases the value of the contribution by
Brams and Ismail (2018).
∙ The Behind-first mechanism outperforms the Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) and the Catch-
up designs, except for model M3, where it is equivalent to the Catch-up rule
according to Proposition 1.
∙ The adjustment of the stochastic designs, suggested by Csato´ (2020), robustly
improves fairness. It is worth guaranteeing the first penalty of the sudden death
stage for team 𝐵.
∙ The 𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴|𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵 rule remains competitive with the Adjusted Catch-up rule in
models M1 and M2, while it is the closest to fairness among all designs considered
here in model M3. If the Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) rule is judged inadequate, and
the use of stochastic mechanisms should be avoided, further steps towards the
Prohuet-True-Morse sequence can be effective to increase fairness.
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Figure 3: The probability that team 𝐴 wins a penalty shootout
over five rounds including sudden death, model M3
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65
0.5
0.51
0.52
0.53
Value of 𝑞
𝑝 = 0.65
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7
0.5
0.51
0.52
0.53
Value of 𝑞
𝑝 = 0.7
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75
0.5
0.52
0.54
0.56
Value of 𝑞
𝑝 = 0.75
Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) rule 𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴|𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵 rule
Catch-up / Behind-first rule Adjusted Catch-up / Behind-first rule
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8
0.5
0.52
0.54
0.56
Value of 𝑞
𝑝 = 0.8
∙ The Adjusted Behind-first rule outperforms all other mechanisms if the first-mover
advantage originates exclusively from the shooting order, that is, model M1 or
model M2 is valid. The compensation of team 𝐵 in the sudden death is so effective
that the winning probability of team 𝐴 becomes non-monotonic as the difference
between 𝑝 and 𝑞 grows. However, the psychological pressure is unlikely to reach
this level in practice, the observation remains a theoretical curiosity.
3.4 Further issues
In the following, we discuss four other topics: the expected length of the sudden death stage
and the probability of reaching it, as well as the complexity and the strategy-proofness of
the mechanisms.
Denote the expected length of the sudden death by 𝜀, and the probability that it
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finishes in a given round by 𝑅. Then
𝜀 = 𝑅 + (1−𝑅)(1 + 𝜀)
because the expected length of the sudden death is 1 + 𝜀 if it is not decided in the first
round. Consequently, 𝜀 = 1/𝑅, which does not depend on the penalty shootout mechanism.
In model M1, 𝑅1 = 𝑝(1− 𝑞)+ (1−𝑝)𝑞 = 𝑝+ 𝑞− 2𝑝𝑞, which has already been calculated
in Brams and Ismail (2018, p. 193). In models M2 and M3, 𝑅2 = 𝑝(1− 𝑞) + (1− 𝑝)𝑝 =
2𝑝−𝑝𝑞−𝑝2, thus the sudden death is expected to be shorter here compared to the previous
model.
Table 3: The probability that a penalty shootout
over five rounds is continued with sudden death
Mechanism Model M1 Model M2 Model M3
𝐴𝐵𝐴𝐵 0.263 0.260 0.215
𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴 0.275 0.266 0.215
𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴|𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵 0.275 0.266 0.215
(Adjusted) Catch-up 0.284 0.274 0.215
(Adjusted) Behind-first 0.319 0.299 0.215
On the other hand, the probability that the sudden death stage is reached can be
influenced by the penalty shootout design. Table 3 reports these values. Note that the
adjustment does not affect the stochastic mechanisms in the regular phase. Penalty
shootouts taken by the Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) and the 𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴|𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵 designs have the
same probability to continue with sudden death in models M1 and M2, where the scoring
probabilities depend only on the shooting order, and both rules provide three penalties for
team 𝐴 and two penalties for team 𝐵 as the first kicker. The sudden death can be avoided
with the highest probability in model M3, which punishes the team already lagging behind.
Since the sudden death is perhaps the most dramatic part of a penalty shootout, media
attention can be maximised by the (Adjusted) Behind-first rule, followed by the (Adjusted)
Catch-up. Deterministic mechanisms seem to be unfavourable from this point of view.
The last column of Table 3 refers to a possible analytical result in the case of model
M3. This is verified below.
Proposition 2. In model M3, the probability of reaching the sudden death is not influenced
by the penalty shootout mechanism, that is, by the shooting order.
Proof. We focus on the standing of the penalty shootout after some rounds. The possible
states can be distinguished by the difference between the number of goals scored by the
two teams, denoted by 𝑘. The transition probabilities from any round to the next round
can be computed easily.
∙ The score difference is 𝑘 = 0
The scores will remain tied if both teams fail in the next round with probability
(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝑝), or both teams succeed in the next round with probability 𝑝𝑞.
Otherwise, the shootout goes to state 𝑘 = 1.
∙ The score difference is 𝑘
The score difference will remain 𝑘 if both teams fail in the next round with
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probability (1− 𝑝)𝑝, or both teams succeed in the next round with probability 𝑝𝑞.
The shootout goes to state 𝑘 + 1 if the team lagging behind misses its penalty,
while the other team scores. This has the probability 𝑝(1− 𝑞), independently of
the shooting order. Otherwise, if the team lagging behind scores and the other
team misses, the penalty shootout goes to state 𝑘 − 1 with probability (1− 𝑝)𝑞.
Table 4: Transition probabilities between the states of a penalty shootout, model M3
To → Possible states
From ↓ Score diff. 𝑘 = 0 Score diff. 𝑘 = 1 Score diff. 𝑘 = 2 · · ·
Score diff. 𝑘 = 0 𝑝𝑞 + (1− 𝑝)(1− 𝑝) 𝑝(1− 𝑞) + (1− 𝑝)𝑝 0 · · ·
Score diff. 𝑘 = 1 (1− 𝑝)𝑞 𝑝𝑞 + (1− 𝑝)(1− 𝑝) 𝑝(1− 𝑞) · · ·
Score diff. 𝑘 = 2 0 (1− 𝑝)𝑞 𝑝𝑞 + (1− 𝑝)(1− 𝑝) · · ·
... ... ... ... . . .
Table 4 overviews the possible moves between these states. Since the transition
probabilities are independent of the mechanism used to determine the shooting order, the
probability that the penalty shootout finishes in the state 𝑘 = 0 at the end of the regular
phase—and continues with the sudden death stage—depends only on the parameters 𝑝
and 𝑞.
Csato´ (2020) quantifies the complexity of a penalty shootout design by the minimal
number of binary questions required to decide which team is the first-mover in a given
round, without knowing the history of the penalty shootout.
Proposition 3. The complexities of the seven penalty shootout designs are as follows:
∙ Standard (𝐴𝐵𝐴𝐵) rule: 0;
∙ Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) rule: 1;
∙ 𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴|𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵 rule: 1;
∙ Catch-Up rule: 2;
∙ Adjusted Catch-Up rule: between 2 and 3;
∙ Behind-first rule: 2;
∙ Adjusted Behind-first rule: between 2 and 3.
Proof. See Csato´ (2020) for the Standard (𝐴𝐵𝐴𝐵), Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴), Catch-up, and
Adjusted Catch-up mechanisms.
The 𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴|𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵 rule can be followed if it is known that the remainder after dividing
the number of the rounds by four is from the set {0; 1} or from the set {2; 3}.
The Behind-first rule requires two questions. If the result is tied, then the first kicker
in the previous round determines the shooting order in the current round. Otherwise, if
the result is not tied, one should know which team is lagging behind.
The Adjusted Behind-first mechanism is composed of the Behind-first rule in the
regular phase (two questions), and the Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) rule in the sudden death (one
question), thus the number of binary questions needed is either two or three, depending
on the answer to the first question.
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Proposition 2 reveals that the complexity measure of Csato´ (2020) is imperfect for
deterministic mechanisms as the 𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴|𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵 rule is more complicated than the Altern-
ating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) rule according to common intuition. Perhaps the set of binary questions
allowed can be restricted to get a better quantification of simplicity.
In deterministic mechanisms, the shooting order cannot be controlled by the teams.
However, under a stochastic rule, the team kicking the second penalty might gain from
deliberately missing it if the rewards outweigh the loss of an uncertain goal.
Strategy-proofness does not mean a serious problem according to the following results.
Proposition 4. The (Adjusted) Catch-up rule is strategy-proof in model M1 if 𝑝− 𝑞 ≤ 0.5.
It cannot be manipulated in models M2 and M3.
Proof. See Brams and Ismail (2018, Proposition 4.1) for model M1.
The idea behind the proof of Brams and Ismail (2018, Proposition 4.1) can be followed
for model M2. The expected gain of the second shooter from trying and succeeding after
the first kicker fails is 1 + 𝑝𝑞 + 𝑝 − 𝑝2 as it scores with probability 𝑝𝑞 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑝 in the
next round. The average gain from not trying is 𝑝 because it is certainly the first-mover
in the next round. The net gain of the second shooter is 1 + 𝑝𝑞 − 𝑝2.
For the first shooter, the expected gain in the next round is 𝑝 goals if the second shooter
tries and scores, otherwise the average gain is the scoring probability as the second-mover,
(1− 𝑝)𝑝+ 𝑝𝑞. The net gain is 𝑝2 − 𝑝𝑞.
Consequently, the net difference in expected goals between the two teams at the end of
the next round is 1 + 𝑝𝑞− 𝑝2− (𝑝2− 𝑝𝑞) = 1, which is always positive. There would be no
incentive for any player to deliberately miss a penalty.
Since the scoring probabilities are independent of the shooting position in model M3, a
deliberate miss cannot yield any profit.
The Adjusted Catch-up rule offers fewer opportunities to change the shooting order,
hence it is strategy-proof if the Catch-up rule satisfies this condition.
Since the difference between the scoring probability of the first and the second shooter
is unlikely to be higher than 50%, the Catch-up rule is essentially non-manipulable.
Proposition 5. The Behind-first rule is always strategy-proof.
Proof. A team can become first-mover from being a second-mover only at the price of
having a lower score, which cannot be optimal.
The Adjusted Behind-first rule offers fewer opportunities to change the shooting order,
hence it is strategy-proof if the Behind-first rule satisfies this condition.
4 Conclusions
We have analysed seven soccer penalty shootout rules in three different mathematical mod-
els. The Standard (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) mechanism is the simplest but a robustly unfair design, at least
compared to the others. The Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) mechanism remains a straightforward
and relatively fair solution, which is already used in tennis tiebreaks. The 𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴|𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵
mechanism is a deterministic rule approaching the Prohuet-Thue-Morse sequence that
further improves fairness and outperforms all other designs in model M3 when the team
lagging behind has a lower scoring probability.
Two stochastic mechanisms have also been evaluated together with their slightly
modified variants. The Catch-up rule yields no gain in fairness compared to the Alternating
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(𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) rule, thus it remains a poor choice to try. Its only advantage resides in the higher
probability of reaching the most exciting sudden death stage but the fairer Behind-first
rule is even better from this aspect. Both the Catch-up and the Behind-first designs can
be adjusted according to the proposal of Csato´ (2020), by compensating team 𝐵—the
second-mover in the first round—in the sudden death phase. These versions do not affect
strategy-proofness and the frequency of sudden death, however, they take a step towards
fairness at the price of marginally increasing complexity.
In the comparison of the designs, only one particular aspect of soccer penalties has
been used, namely, that the majority of them are successful. Therefore, most findings
remain valid and applicable in other sports. For instance, the order of actions influences
multi-game chess matches, too, where playing white pieces confers an advantage for winning
that is similar to kicking the first penalty in a soccer penalty shootout (Gonza´lez-Dı´az
and Palacios-Huerta, 2016).
While the IFAB has recently agreed to stop the experiments with fairer penalty shootout
systems, the debate will probably continue as advancing to the next round in a knockout
tournament has huge financial implications. In addition, the use of penalty shootouts can
spread further in the future. For example, Palacios-Huerta (2018) recommends to apply
them in the group matches of the 2026 FIFA World Cup. The theoretical results above
can help to decide what mechanisms are worthwhile to choose for implementing on the
field. Hopefully, our paper might also become a starting point and a standard reference
for later research on soccer penalty shootouts.
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